I used to be a fixed income derivatives trader. I have a Masters in Economics, with a specialization in Econometrics and Financial Derivatives Pricing. I work in technology now because, while in grad-school, I learnt how to code FORTRAN-77. If you wanted to be a quant, and you wanted to price exotic financial derivatives, you had to solve partial differential equations. The only way to do that was to use numerical methods that involved backward induction. And unless you wanted to spend weeks doing it by hand, you were forced to code up a pricer leveraging FORTRAN-77, numerical recipes and code from my brilliant thesis adviser, Robbie Jones.
I got bored with trading at Wells Fargo, moved over to building derivatives trading systems, and since then, have spent time at technology companies and at Ernst & Young. While at EY, I worked in the Financial Services Advisory practice. I have seen and audited the risk management systems at a half dozen of the largest financial institutions in the world.
The WSJ isn’t explaining much
I have just finished reading How to Lose $7.2 Billion: A Trader’s Tale in the Wall Street Journal by David Gauthier-Villars and Carrick Mollenkamp.
Is it just me, or has the WSJ already sunk in quality since the Rupert Murdoch purchase?
The journalists don’t explain much. Was Jérôme Kerviel working on a desk that clearly allowed proprietary positions? It isn’t clear. Was it a pass-through desk dynamically hedging customer accommodations? It isn’t clear from the article.
His other job consisted of betting on whether European stock markets would rise or fall. The roughly 20 traders on the Delta One desk were supposed to offset each bet that a stock index would rise with another bet in the opposite direction in order to keep risk at minimum levels. The difference between the parallel bets would generate either a profit or a loss.
That is a seriously terrible explanation. Any trader worth his or her salt can take huge risks even with hedges in place.
There are 50 different ways to bet on an index. What was this guy trading? What kind of hedges were supposed to be in place? What were the risk limits? Were there notional limits? Delta limits? Vega? Theta?
There is no mention of any of this in the article. In other words, for people who really know this business, and honestly, it really isn’t that hard to figure out, the article doesn’t explain anything.
And for people who don’t know much about financial derivatives, the article gives a completely false sense that the truth has been explained. It hasn’t.
SocGen was up by 500 Million Euros… but didn’t notice
The article does say that this trader had SocGen up by 500 million euros as one point, but that the bank didn’t notice.
I have one question only: “How?”
Derivatives trades may be complex bets, but they do result in real money flowing back and forth. That real money comes out of real bank accounts. Eventually, the CFO has to notice. Something like
“Holy Crap!, we have 500 Million more Euros than we thought we would”
And, when your bets start to get into the Billions of Euros, if you are betting exchange traded futures, real margin calls start to happen. If you are betting OTC derivatives, other banks, with half way decent internal controls, start calling you up and asking for more collateral.
The SocGen CFO and the head of Treasury should have noticed.
Fake Emails Fooled the Mid Office? Come On!
Beyond that, the fact that any trader could produce fake emails to calm a back office is… well BS. Here’s how it works at every major bank I’ve ever seen:
- Trader does a trade with Bank X and enters it into the trade capture system
- A back office person directly contacts their counterpart at Bank X and confirms the trade. The variation is that the back office person gets a daily report from Bank X (or Exchange Y).
- The second back office person sends a legal confirmation to Bank X, which is then sent back.
This double confirmation process makes it impossible to fake trades. The process above is how it works for Over The Counter (OTC) trades. It essentially follows the same pattern, but is much more automated for exchange traded derivatives.
And What About the Market Risk Management?
The article talks about all the fancy quants working at SocGen. Without a nose for profit and a drive for blood, all the math in the world ain’t worth a damn.
But, quant geeks should be able to get you a half way decent risk management report. And if not, you can buy one from BlackRock or some similar shop.
A stupidly simplistic report would show trades netted out and thus allow fake trades to mask the impact of real positions. But no one with half a brain uses such simplistic reports. You split the trades apart. You find out were the notionals are out of whack.
- Look here, Bob is betting $10M on March DAX contract, and $50B on the June one. Hmmmm
A $7.2B loss. This doesn’t look like a rouge. This looks like one poor patsy being forced to act the scapegoat for gang of bumbling arrogant fools. Fire the CEO. Fire the CFO. Fire the entire trading management team. Morons!
Sphere It